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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~T_A_rrE OF UTAH, by and through its 
EXGIX:B~ERING COMMI'SSION, D. 
H. \\7"HlTTENBl ... RG, Chair1nan, H. 
J. COR.LEISSEN and LAY T 0 N 
~L_\XFIELD, ~{embers of the Engin-
eering Conunission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BlTRTON F. PEEK and CHARLES D. 
WI~I.A.~, Trustees under the Will and 
of the Estate of CHARLES H. 
DEERE, Deceased, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
"7867 
c·hapter 13, First Special Session, Laws of Utah 
1951, became effective June 18th of that year. (Session 
Laws, p. 17.) By that Act plaintiff was required "forth-
with" to condemn for State Park purposes a large tract 
of land ~pecifically described by metes and bounds. (Act, 
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Sec. 8a.) Pursuant thereto on July 10, 1951 the Engin-
eering Cormnission pa~sed a "Condemnation Resolution" 
(R. 5) and irnn1ediately thereafter filed its complaint in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County. (Case No. 92516.) 
This co1nplaint contains the usual averments to 
support the prayer for condemnation, sets forth the in-
terests which the various defendants may have or claim, 
and then ipsa dixit allocates the land to be condemned 
and the interests of the various defendants into twenty-
eight "parcels" and two additional "outstanding inter-
ests". (R. 1-20.) Tvventy-seven of these "parcels" con-
sist of described tracts owned hy na1ned defendants other 
than the appellants. (R. 6-15.) "Parcel 28" is then in 
effect described as the entire property exactly as set out 
in the legislative rnandate, less the twenty-seven other 
described parcels and so1ne other interests for unassjgned 
reasons also excluded. ( R. 15-1'7.) 
The tract which the Utah Legislature at its special 
session commanded plaintiff "to forthwith condemn" is 
an area of several square miles located at the mouth of 
Emigration Canyon east of Salt Lake City. It includes 
130.23 acres of a total of approximately 215.73 acres 
owned by these particular defendants and appellants in 
the general vicinity; the Jerry Jones tract of 5. 7 acres; 
the Tedesco tract of 6.46 acres ; the Wheelwright tract 
of 9.41 acres; twenty-six individual subdivided residen-
tial lots comprising a total of some 8 acres owned by 
various defendants, on some of which homes were in 
various stages of construction; and 7.66 acres of dedi-
cated streets other tha.n the 'State Highway through 
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}:InigTation Canyon \Vith it~ branch to the adjaePnt 
~Lonu1nent and the u1ain County Road leading to the 
~outh. T'he area. \\·a~ in Yariou~ ~tage~ of develop1nent 
fron1 bare n1ountain~ide to ro1npleted residPnees in 
platted and re~tricted subdiYisions \\~herein were in place 
dedieated streets, curb and gutter, drainage facilitie~, 
iire hydrantt' and the usual utilities of water, power, 
telephone and ga~. (lt Ex. 1, p. 154.) 
Because of the large extent of the area involving 
nu1nerous defendants and interests, pursuant to Section 
104-35-6 of the Judicial Code and Rule 42(h) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure plaintiff asked the court in its dis-
cretion to sever issues pertaining to these particular 
defendants ( R. 51) ; and the court so ordered ( R. 51, 82). 
It wa8 also ordered pursuant to stipulation that a sepa-
rate record in this case should be maintained pertaining 
to these parties only ( R. 89-90), hereinafter referred to 
a~ the ··plaintiff" and the "Deere Estate" or "defend-
ant~~·. 
In addition to the usual prayer for condemnation 
the eon1plaint prayed for an order of immediate occu-
pancy ""for the purpose of commencing such construction 
and in1provement of a State Park." (R. 19.) However, 
the Legislature had enacted no plans for such construc-
tion and improvement beyond the bare condemnation 
Inandate, and this motion was not pressed but in fact 
'\\C'as resisted by plaintiff. (R. 82.) Summons was served 
on July 12, 1951, whereupon there became applicable the 
provisions of Section 104-34-11 of the Judicial Code, 
which reads as follows : 
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104-34-ll. When Right to Damages Deemed to 
Ha/ce Accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation 
and da1nages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the service of su1n-
1nons, and its actual value at that date shall be 
the 1neasure of con1pensation for all property to 
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to 
property not actually taken, but injuriously af-
fected, in all cases where such damages are 
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section. 
No improvements put up·on the property subse-
quent to the date of service of· summons shall be 
included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages. 
By its separate answer (R. 21-42) the Deere Estate 
raised as an issue the necessity for the condemnation, 
from an adverse determination of which no appeal is 
taken. Defendants also raised therein the dual issues of 
first, the extent of the property to be condemned in terms 
of "separate parcels" and parts thereof; and secondly, the 
time of and extent of the damage resulti;ng fron1 the 
taking, for which the State and Federal Constitutions 
guaranteed the condemnee "just compensation". 
Plaintiff's 1notion to strike the answer was granted 
as to all affirmative 1natters therein (R. 21, 43). 
(a) More specifically, the answer (R. 12) denied 
the State's allegation that the Deere Estate property 
consisted of but a single parcel, or "the whole of an 
entire parcel". (R. 19.) Defendants in their answer set 
forth in detail their contention as to each of the parcels 
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involved and the fair n1arket values thereof a~ of .July 
12, 1951 (R. ~1-39). The separate answer also set forth 
defendants' clain1s for severance da1nages (R. 39-40). 
In this connection the applicable portions of Section 
104-34-10 of the Judicial (_~ode read as follows: 
10-!-3±-10. CoHlJJensati.on and damages - Ho1i-' 
Assessed. 
The court, jury or referee n1ust hear such 
legal evidence as 1nay be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon n1ust 
ascertain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
conde1nned and all improvements thereon apper-
taining to the realty, and of each and every sepa-
rate estate or interest therein; and if it consists 
of different parcels, the value of each pa.rcel and of 
each estate or interest therein shall be separately 
assessed. 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a la.rger parcel, the 
dan1ages which 'vill accrue to the portion not 
sought to be conde1nned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvernent in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
* * * 
( 5) As far as practicable compensation must 
be assessed for each source of damages separately. 
(Chapter 58, Laws of Utah 1951.) 
The essential physical facts as to the nature of the 
Deere Estate p-roperty-a total of approximately 215.73 
acres in the vicinity-are not in dispute. The property is 
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described in detail in the separate answer (R. 21-42), the 
Brayton affidavit (R . .:14-47), the supplemental Brayton 
affidavit (R. 68-77); and its characteristics are shown in 
the Inaps attached to the separate answer, the court's 
order of 11arch 5, 1952 (R. 81-88) and the large maps 
which are Exhibits 1 and B. F·or a ready reference de-
fendants suggest use o£ the map found at page 78 of the 
record reproduced herein, or that between pages 47 and 
48 of the record, which is a workable reduction of the 
larger maps. 
In barest outline the Deere Estate property north of 
Emigration Canyon Road included 21 of a total of 38 
platted lots in Oak Hills Plat "A," a recorded residential 
subdivision; 41 of a total of 46 lots in the immediately 
adjacent unrecorded Oak Hills subdivision; and a 3.96-
acre area known as I-C. All of these, together with 
r_rract I-Da 1nile to the south and completely segregated, 
were lu1nped together as "Parcel 1" by the court's order 
.of March 5, 1952. (R. 81-88.) Also on the north side of the 
canyon were 51 of a total of 55 partially subdivided lots 
in an area still further to the north and east knovvn as 
I\1-A; and finally all of the remaining land, largely un-
improved or "raw," colored on the maps in brown and blue 
and known as areas II and VI. Included on the extreme 
east end of Tract VI was the Deere Estate water source 
and collecting system, with transmission and distribution 
lines extending to the platted lots to the west. 
On the south side of Emigration Canyon Road, in 
addition to Tract I-D in the extreme southwest corner, 
was the remaining "bottom land" alongside Emigration 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Canyon strea1n, Area III; a cotnpletely isolated area to 
the east, Area ,,.. ; the acreage north of dedicated Ken-
nedy Drive extending to the bro\Y of the plateau; and 
finally a part only of the area south of ICennedy Drive, 
~eYered from the balance of the Deere Estate's re1naining 
property extending still further to the south by the 
straight line boundary of the legislative fiat. The court's 
order of :llarch 5, 1952 lun1ped all of this into "Parcel 2", 
together with all of those portions on the north side of 
E1nigra.tion Canyon not included in "Parcel 1." (R. 81-
SS and Inap a part of this order, and Ex. B.) 
Included with the conden1ned land in addition to the 
\Yater systeu1 were various interests in streets, water 
rights and other items the details of which are not 
involved in this appeal. Some of these interests plaintiff 
itself excluded from consideration in the conden1nation 
proceeding for various reasons not here involved, and 
other~ \Yere excluded by the court but are not involved 
in this appeal. 
Rejecting both plaintiff's contention that defendant~' 
land consisted of but the single "Parcel 28," and defend-
ants' contention that many separate parcels were in-
volved, the court initially determined on the basis of the 
Brayton affidavit and defendants' answer to interroga-
tories (R. 44-47, 57-58) that defendants' property to be 
condemned consisted of these two, and only two "parcels," 
) J all of each of which was to be condemned with accordingly 
no severance damage. (R. 81-88 and map attached to this 
order, par. 4 thereof, R. 92.) 
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An application for an interlocutory appeal fron1 this 
crucial order \Yas denied by this court. (Case No. 7839.) 
The District Court thereafter consistently adhered 
to this Btwo-parcel decision" and its resultant implica-
tions "rhen fro111 ti1ne to time issues pertaining thereto 
were raised during the further proceedings, such as by 
defendants' proposed Instructions 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18 
and 20. (R. 100-110.) All evidence as to severance damage 
was exc 1 uded and elirnina ted from consideration by the 
jury; e.g., the court refused to give defendants' requested 
Instructions Nos. 13, 14 and 16. (R. 105-108.) These de-
fendants duly excepted to the court'·s instructions, which 
were given consistently in accordance with its initial 
"two-parcel" order, e.g., Instructions 6, 8 and 9. (R. 112-
11-t). The court rejected all evidence as to lot values, 
etc. (R. 95-96.) The water system was lumped in as 
part of "Parcel 2." (R. 97-98.) 
(b) .. AJso alleged in the answer and stricken wa~ 
defendants' averrnent that under the circumstances of this 
case and the application of the special legislative man-
date to this particular property, the effective date of tak-
ing for all practical purposes, and thus the time of ac-
crual of defendants' constitutional right to damages, wa! 
July 12, 1951, the date summons was served; and the dam-
ages thus would include not only the fa~r market value 
of the property taken as of that date, but also interest 
thereon from that date until payment. (R. 40.) 
As to this issue, the court likewise continued to 
adhere to its early decision that the time of taking of 
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both title and po8session \Vould not be until entr~' of the 
conden1na tion judg1uen t (:\I ay ~7, 1 ~)5:2) ; the ref ore the 
a\vard of just co1npensation should not include interest 
frou1 July 1:2, 1~)5:2 until ti1ne of pay1nent. For exa1nple, 
a requested instruction to allo\\~ interest was refused 
(R. 111); and defendants' n1otion to include such interest 
. . 
in the judg1nent on the yerdict (R. 127 -128) was denied. 
(R. 1:29.) 
Judg1uent on the jury's Yerdict was 1n due course 
n1ade and entered l\Iay 10, 1952. (R. 117-126.) Thereafter 
plaintiff deposited \Yith the court its draft for the amount 
of the jury's verdict and costs. (R. 130.) On May 27, 1952 
the court 1nade and entered the usual condemnation judg-
Inent "~hereby plaintiff took title and possession. (R. 131-
139.) 
From both the judgment on the verdict and the final 
judg1nent of conden1nation, defendants on June 9, 1952 
a ppea.led to this court. ( R. 146.) 
II. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court improperly refused to award defend-
ants as a part of the just compensation to be paid pur-
suant to state and federal Constitutions not only the fair 
Inarket value of defendants' property as of the date taken, 
but in addition interest upon that fair market value com-
puted at the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10, 
1952, 'vhen the fair market value was determined. 
:2. The court improperly refused to allow these de-
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fendants to cross exantine plaintiff's expert witnesses on 
the subject of the actual market values of cornparable 
pro1>ertv as of J ulv 12 1951 and likewise excluded evi-
. ~ ' ' 
dence as to the actual rnarket values of such cornparable 
propertie~. 
:L ']~he court below improperly refused to allo'v ap-
pellanh~ to introduce evidence relating to the fair rnarket 
Yalue of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part 
thereof. 
-l-. ri'he COUl't i1nproperly ruled that the property 
of appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole 
of hut two separate parcels, each to be separately assess-
ed. 
5. The court irnproperly eliminated the Issue of 
severance darnages. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Point. 
1. The court improperly refused to award defendants 
as a part of the just compensation to be paid pursuant to 
state and federal Constitutions not only the fair market 
value of defendants' property as of the date taken, but in 
addition interest upon that fair market value computed at 
the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10, 1952, when 
that fair market value was determined. 
Utah took from the owners the Deere Estate prop-
erty. when pursuant to specific legislative ma.ndate, sum-
mons was served July 12, 1951. Possession as such be-
came worthless the moment the special legislation was 
10 
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enacted; certainly not later than the tilne sunnnons was 
served. For practical and n1oral purposes this had actual-
ly occurred 'vhen Chapter 13 beca1ne effective June 18, 
1951, for the owners could hardly continue their develop-
Inent operations in the light of an inevitable acquisition 
by the State. 
K ot only "~as there no value to the ternporarily ex-
tended bare right of possession of this property which 
could no longer be sold, improved, developed or used. 
Actually it was a burden, for defendants were required 
to continue operation of its pumps to keep the water sys-
tenl fron1 freezing. ''rhen defendants called up plaintiff's 
n1otion for occupancy, the plaintiff resisted its own mo-
tion. ( R. S2.) Yet the court below refused to permit proof 
of the obvious facts -sho,ving the deprivation of defend-
ants' property, and struck defendants' averments in their 
answer 'Yith respect thereto. (R. 21, 42.) 
Article I of Utah's Constitution reads in part as fol-
lows: 
S.ec. 7. (Due process of la.w.) 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Sec. 22. (Private property for p·ublic use.) 
Private property shall not be taken or danl-
ages for public use without just compensation. 
Likewise, payment of "just compensation" is required 
of the State of Utah by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, the test being the same as is re-
quired of the Federal Government itself under the Fifth 
11 
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An1end1nent. For exan1ple, see Orgel on Valuation under 
J~J1ninent Do1nain, Section 5, page 17, wherein it is said: 
'"~ince the Fourteenth Antendrnent of the 
Federal Constitution is binding on every state, 
this requireu1ent (of just con1pensation) deter-
Inines the minimum basis of compensation 
throughout the entire United States." 
The United States Suprerne Court has phrased "just 
contpensation" to be "the full and perfect equivalent of 
the property taken." Without elaborating principles now 
so fundamental a part of the law of eminent domain, we 
invite attention to the following key cases: 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. Co. v. 
Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 s .. Ct. 581; 
Ettor v. Tacorna, 
228 U.S. 148, 57 L. ed 733, 33 S. Ct. -t-28; 
McCoy v. Union Elevated RR. Co., 
24 7 U.S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1158, 38 R. Ct. 504; 
Bragg v. \Veaver, 
251 U.S. 57, 64 L. ed. 135, 40 S. Ct. 62; 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v. 
Morristown, 
276 U.S. 182, 72 L. ed. 523, -±R S. Ct. 276; 
Olson v. United States, 
292 U.S. 246, 7S L. ed. 1236, 54 S. Ct. 704; 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 299, 30-t, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354, 256, 
67 L. ed. 664. 
Allowance of interest pursuant to the overriding con-
stitutional provisions is implied in the absence of express 
12 
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~tatutory authorization of such. Other,Yi~P the eondeinna-
tion legi~lation "·ould Yiolate the federal and usually 
also the applicable ~tate constitutional provisions. Siin-
Inons Y. J)illon, (\\r. \Ta.) l~l;i ~.E. 331, ll;J 1\.L.H. 7H7. 
Thn~ in the Seaboard Air Line case cited above, the 
court held: 
·~The eornpensation to \Yhich the owner is en-
titled i~ the full and perfect equivalent of the prov-
erty taken. ~lonongahela Nav. Co. v. linited 
States, (supra) 1-lS lT. S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622, 37 L. 
Ed. 4G3. It rests on equitable principles and it 
1neans substantially that the owner shall be put in 
a~ good position pecuniarily as he would have been 
i.f his property had not been taken. (Citing cases.) 
He is entitled to the darnages inflicted by the tak-
Ing ... 
.. ,,~here the l-:-nited States condemns and take~ 
lH)~~es~ion of land before ascertaining or paying 
eou1pen~a tion, the owner is not limited to the value 
of the property at the time of the taking; he is en-
titled to such addition as will produce the full equi-
valent of that value paid contemporaneously with 
the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good 
1uea~ure by 'vhich to ascertain the a1nount so to be 
added. The legal rate of interest, as established 
by the South Carolina statute was applied in this 
case. This was a "palpably fair and reasonable 
method of performing the indispensable condition 
to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, 
narnely, of making "just compensation" for the 
land as it stands, at the time of taking.' ... 
uThe addition of interest allowed by the Di:s-
trict Court is necessary in order that the owner 
:;;hall not suffer loss and shall have 'just compensa-
13 
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tion' to 'vhich he is entitled." 
Again in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 
U.S. 106, 44 s .. Ct. 471, 68 L. ed. 934, the court said: 
"'And, if the taking precedes the payment of 
co1npensation, the owner is entitled to such addi-
tion to the value at the ti1ne of the taking as will 
produce the full equivalent of such value paid con-
temporaneously. Interest at a 1Jroper rate is a 
good measure of the amount to be added." (Italics 
ours.) 
The same rule was applied in United States v. Rogers, 
255 U.S. 163, 41 S. Ct. 281,65 L. ed. 566. 
The Utah statute is of course silent with respect to 
any allowance of interest, thus requiring application of 
the foregoing rule. 
Utah's condemnation statutes which implement these 
constitutional minimum requirements are neither unique 
nor unusual. Section 104-34-10 provides for the determin-
ation of the value of the property taken, and lays down 
rules for determination of that value. The section follow-
ing then provides that "the right thereto shall be deemed 
to have accrued" to that value and is to be measured ae 
of the date of service of summons. Counterparts of these 
provisions are found in California, Deering's 1941 Civil 
Code, ~§ 1249, 1254; in the Idaho Code, ~~ 7-712 and 7-717; 
and in Montana Revised Codes 1935, §§ 9945 and 9952. 
(a) On facts such as are here present, payment of 
interest is required. 
On facts similar to those pertaining to the Deere Es-
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tate property, and applying the identical Idaho statute 
to a en~e where a large tract of land was condemned for 
purposes connected \Yi th the .. :\1uerican F·alls Reservoir> 
the Federal District ("ourt ~quarely held that to the 
a\Yard of the fair 1uarket value as of the date ~n1nn1ons 
"~as ~erYed should be added interest. United States v. 
Bro,vn, ~~~)F. lt)S. On cross \Vrit of error fron1 the award 
of interest, the United States Supreine Court affirmed. 
Brown Y. lTnited States, :263 lT.S. 78, 68 L. ed. 171. The 
court in part said: 
~~The district court, in directing the jury, fol-
lo,ved the la"~ of the state (Idaho Con1p. Laws 
1919, § 7-± 15 ; Idaho Rev. Codes 1908, § 5221) in 
which the land lay and the court was sitting, as fol-
lO\\Ts: 
·~For the purpose of assessing con1pensation 
and da1nages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the summons, and its 
actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of 
compensation for all property to be actually taken . 
. . . No improvements put upon the property sub-
sequent to the date of the service of summons shall 
be included in the assessment of compensation or 
da1nages." 
"'The Idaho statute has been construed by the 
circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit to 
justify the court in adding interest upon the value 
fixed by the jury from the date of the summons 
until the judgment. Weiser Valley Land & Water 
Co. v. Ryan, 111 C.C.A. 221, 190 Fed. 417, 424. The 
court said: 
"Having such right ·to compensation at a 
given time, it would seem that the owner ought to 
15 
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ha\-e interest on the arnount ascertained until paid. 
In the 1neanwhile he can claim nothing for added 
inllH'OYelnents nor is he entitled to any advance 
' '' that n1ight affect the value of the property. 
•'* ·~ * It often happens that in the delays in-
tident to conden1nation suits the loss to the o\\-ner 
arising fron1 the delay between the sum1nons and 
the vesting of title by judgment is a serious one. 
rrhe interest charge under the Idaho statute has 
the wholesorne effect of stimulating the plaintiff in 
condemnation to proinpt action. Moreover, the 
plaintiff 1nay reduce to a 1ninimum the rents and 
profits enjoyed by the defendant, because, under 
the Idaho statute, the plaintiff 1nay have a suln-
Inary preliminary hearing before commissioners to 
fix probable damages, and by depositing the 
a1nount so fixed with the clerk of the court, i_f the 
defendant 'viii not accept it, the plaintiff 1nay ob-
tain irnmediate possession. Within less than a 
1nonth after bringing suit, he can thus appropriate 
to himself the rents and profits of the land, and 
in enjoyn1ent of them can await the final judgn1ent. 
2 Idaho Co1np. ·stat. 1919, § 7420; 2 Idaho Rev. 
Codes 1908, § 5226." 
A concise staternent of the rule in such cases is found 
in Duncan-Hood Corporation v. City of Summit, (N.~J.), 
146 Atl. 182, wherein the court states: 
~·The final ground for reversal urged is that 
the trial court added to the verdicts, as returned 
by the jury, interest fron1 the date of the adoption 
of the ordinance to the date of rendering the Yrr-
dicts. . 
"This was not error. As before indicated the 
. taking of the lands of respondents was as of' and 
fron1 the date the ordinance in question became 
16 
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effectiYe ... A.t that date the dantag-e, if any, to re-
~pondent~ aro~e and arerued, and the~· \verP en-
titled to he con1pen~ated a~ of tl1at date. ~nch 
con1pensation lu.1Ying been "·ithlH_\ld, thP:~ ,,·erP (~n­
titled to the a111ount thereof, together \Yith interP~t 
for the forbearance. 
H For the reason~ herein set forth, the jndg-
Inents under reYie"'" are reYer~ed, and a venire de 
novo awarded. 
··For affirmanee: None. 
··For reversal: The CHANCELLOR, the 
CHIEF Jl"'"STICE, Justices TRENCHARD, 
PARKER, CAl\iPBELL, LLOYD, and CASE, 
and Judges \~AN BlTSI{IRK, ~IeGLENNON, 
l(.A .. YS, HETFIELD, and DEAR." 
To these unanimous decisions of the federal district, 
~.ircuit and ~upreme courts involving the identical statu-
tor~~ provisions applied to facts similar to those in this 
ease, and to the opinion of the highest of the New Jersey 
court:', ":-e add the opinion of the Michigan Supren1e Court 
in an analogous situation. Campau v. City of Detroit, 196 
N.,~v. 5:27, 32 A.L.R. 91. Here also land for a pToposed 
public park \Yas involved, to be condemned under a pro-
cedure \vherein the City had one years' time within which 
to pay the award after it should be confirmed and thus 
becon1e final. Confirmation corresponded in the present 
ea~e to the date of the passage of Chapter 13, or at most 
the date of service of summons, at which time the injury 
and da1nages to the Deere Estate became fixed by virtue 
of the legislative mandate. 
ln the 1\fichigan case the owner claimed interest be-
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tween the date of "'taking," and the date of actual pay-
ment of the award. As here, the condemnor tendered 
the award without such interest which the owner refused 
' 
to accept in full settlement. During the interim, as here, 
the owner continued in possession, and the or~inance was 
silent as to interest. 
Interest was allowed, in view of the Federal Consti-
tution and the similar provisions of the Michigan Consti-
tution. 
With the exception of the foregoing decisions directly 
or by analogy in point, we have found no other applicable 
determinations by courts of other jurisdictions. The rea-
son is obvious, for almost invariably the taking in condem-
nation proceedings coincides with payment, or at a least 
payment occurs within a .reasonable time of the determin-
ation of the amount of compensation due. However, gene-
ral discussions and annotations on the allowability of in-
terest, even though the owner remains in possession, may 
be found in connection with the Brown case at 68 L. ed. 
171 ; in 96 · A.L.R. 196, supplemented at 111 A.L.R. 1306, 
paragraphs VIII (b) ; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., 
§ 7 42, p. 1319; Orgel's Valuation under Eminent Domain, 
§ 5, p. 17; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain,§ 275; and 29 
C.J.S., Eminent Domain,§ 176, where it is noted on page 
1054 that "the 1nere fact of delay in ·bringing to a hearing 
the determination of da1nage does not defeat the owner's 
right to interest." 
It is respectfully submitted that justice, logic and 
reason support the authorities above which wnder· the 
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facL..,· of this particular case hold that the taking of the 
O\\yner'~ property and the injury and da1nage to thP Deere 
}~~tate here occurred June 18, 1951, or at lea~t by J·uly 
12, 1951 ~ and that accordingly intere~t ~ubsequent to that 
date should be nllo,ved as a part of the just co1npensation 
to 1nake the O\Yner "Thole. \\ ... ith respect to the wisdon1 of 
the action taken by unequiYocal n1andate of Utah's legi:-;-
la ture, "ye are not here concerned. 
(b) Utah is in accord. 
This Court in the case of F·ell v. Union Pacific l{R. 
Co., 3~ l:tah 101, 88 P. 1003, 28 L.R.A. 1, reviewed ex-
tensively the reason for the allowance of interest, suln-
Inarizing a~ follo,vs: 
··The true test to be applied as to whether in-
terest should be allowed before judgment in a 
given case or not is, therefore, not whether the 
da1nages are unliquidated or otherwise, but 
\Yhether the injury and consequent damages are 
co1nplete and must be ascertained ·as of a particu-
lar tiine and in accordance with fixed rules of 
e·vidence and known standards of value, which the 
court or jury must follow in fixing the amount, 
rather than be guided by their best judgment in as-
sessing the an1ount to be allowed for past as well 
a~ for future injury, or for elements that cannot 
he 1neasured by any fixed standards of value. 
* * *'' 
Here it will be noted that the three factors of the 
"true test" were each present: 
a. The injury and consequent damage to the Deere 
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Estate were con1plete June 18, 1951, or certainly when 
summons was served July 12, 1951; 
b. Dan1ages 'vere to be deterrnined as of that par-
ticular time ; and 
c. Dan1ages were to be determined 1n accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence. 
Of course where there has be.en no damage and hence 
the taking does not occur until the final condemnation 
judgment, the tests outlined above are not met. Thus this 
court has held that where the owners remain in continued 
enjoyment of the property with no impairrnent as to its 
use, there is no right to interest because there has been no 
loss to be compensated. Such cases stand on their own 
facts, e.g., Oregon Short Line RR. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 
147, 80 P. 732, and Salt Lake & Utah RR. Co. v. Schramm, 
56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90. Here, we again reiterate, under the 
facts of the peculiar legislative mandate and the applic-
able general statutes the Deere Estate was just as effec-
tively deprived of its property June 18, 1951 or at least 
by July 12, 1951 as if the State of Utah had then physi-
cally obtained possession. The injury and the damage 
were then complete and the only thing remaining was to 
determine the extent ·of that damage in accordance with 
the fixed rules of evidence and the proceedings applic-
able to conden1nation cases. 
That no actual physical taking at all is necessary 
was the holding in the case of State v. F'ourth Judicial 
District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502, the court dividing, 
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ho,veyer, a~ to ''"hether the facts in the partieular easP 
eon~tituted a taking. 
_Ho"~ different the faet~ here, 'vhere to quote fro1n 
the ~upre1ne courts of Connecticut and Minnesota, the 
o'vner, effective at least by July 1:2, 1951, was "practically 
depriYed of his right to dispose of the land. !lis posses-
sion is precarious, liable to be ter1ninated at any ti1ne; he 
cannot safely rent; he cannot safely in1prove; if he sows, 
he cannot be sure that he will reap." Clark v. Cox, 
(Conn.) 5t) _Atl. ~d 512; \\"'" arren v. Railroad, 21 Minn. 424, 
-!27. 
Fron1 the facts in this case it is obvious that posses-
sion by the Deere Estate became worse than valueless 
June 18, 1951 or certainly when summons was served. 
Not only could the estate for practical purposes neither 
dispose of, rent, improve, or far1n the land; the owner 
had to terminate the various improvement contracts and 
then continue to maintain the utility pumps to avoid ex-
tensive damage to the water system without compensation 
until the State eventually should conclude the act di-
rected "forthwith" by the legislature, by inevitably tak-
ing legal title and possession. 
(c) A new trial is not required. 
Mathematically, the interest on the fair market value 
of the defendants' property between the date of the in-
jury and the time when the amount of the award was de-
termined can readily be computed. At six per cent it 
a1nounts to $24,799.32 for the period July 12, 1951 until 
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~fay 10, 1952. 
This amount the court below could and should have 
included in the judgment on the verdict, no jury question 
being involved. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Oliver (Okla.), 
87 P. 423, 2 Lewis on Eminent Dornain, ~ 742 at page 1324. 
This error can be corrected by simple direction of 
this court, no new trial or resubmission to the jury being 
required. 
Thus in Reed v. Chicago, Mil~aukee & St. Paul RR. 
Co. (C.C.), 25 F. 886, Mr. Justice 'Shiras said: 
"Until the verdict is rendered it cannot be 
known whether plaintiff may be entitled to inter-
est. When this is determined by the amount of 
the verdict, the court can then n1ake the proper 
order, and the same will form part of the adjudica-
tion, settling damages." 
Accordingly on appeal the Circuit Court determined the 
amount of interest to which plaintiff was entitled, added 
this to the amount of the verdict as returned by the jury, 
and rendered judgment for the aggregate amount. 
Again, the case of Alloway v. N ashvill~, 88 Tenn. 510, 
13 S.W. 123, 8 L.R.A. 123, was a condemnation proceed-
ing. No instruction as to interest was given or requested 
and none was allowed by the jury. Before judgment was 
rendered Alloway moved the court to add interest, as 
the defendants did here for the Deere Estate; and there 
also the motion was rejected and on appeal such refusal 
was assigned as error. The Supreme Court said: 
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·'Refu~al to add intt1rest \Vas error. * =~ * 
Ina~nnuch as the t1ITor ean be readily corrected 
here, that \\"ill be donP, instead of reversing and 
re1uanding. l'his eourt "Till render the judgtnen t 
that should have heen rendered below." 
Ree also '': arren v. 8t. Paul & Pacific RR. ( 10., ~1 
.Jiinn. -1:2-!., and \Y.hiteacre v. 8t. Paul & Sioux RR. Co., 
2-l ~linn. 311, \Yhere the sa1ne practice is approved by the 
~Iinnesota Supretne Court; and also 3 Elliott on Rail-
roads, p. 1457, and 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 277. 
Finally, although the cases and authorities are nuut-
erous enunciating the principle, we refer to the recent 
opinion of this court in Morris v. Russell, 236 P. 2d 451, 
'vhere the same rule \Vas invoked. References thereir1 
were made to decisions in Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky> 
Illinois, and to another recent decision of this court in 
Simmons v. Wilkin, 80 Utah 362, 15 P. 2d 321. 
Point. 
2. The court improperly refused to allow these de-
fendants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witnesses on the 
subject of the actual market values of comparable property 
as of July 12, 1951, and likewise excluded direct evidence as 
to the actual market values of such comparable properties. 
Plaintiff's witnesses all had had extensive exper-
ience and were familiar with the property under con-
demnation, as well as comparable properties and their 
market values. They were each permitted accordingly to 
express their opinion as to the fair market value of the 
two parcels. For example, reference is made to. the·testi-
lnony of Witness Edward ::vr. Ashton in this respect. 
(S.R. 29-37.) 
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On cross examination (he court below absolutely 
excluded defendant from testing the experts' opinions 
on the basis of the market values of such comparable 
lands. For exa1nple, Witness Ashton was asked with 
respect to the adjacent Indian Hills Subdivision, and 
objections to such line of questioning were sustained. 
MR. BEHLE : I assume, for the record, I am 
foreclosed in testing this witness in respect to 
con1parative values on any basis; front foot, ·acre-
age, per lot, as well as asking him in regard to his 
subdivision~ 
THE C01TRT: Well, you may, unless there 
is objection, proceed the same with him as you 
did with Mr. Kiepe. Is that what you mean~ 
MR. BEHLE: Well, I thought the rulings 
cut n1e off from any of that so I wanted to be sure. 
In other words, I understand I can't ask the wit-
ness \vhat land in the vicinity comparable to this 
land sells for, either by an acre basis or a front 
foot basis, or a lot basis, is that correct~ 
THE COURT: Well, yes. I ruled against 
you on that with Mr. Kiepe and I would do the 
same with Mr. Ashton. 
l\1R. BEHLE : Yes, sure. In other words, I 
can't test on comparative sales, on comparative 
sales prices~ 
THE COURT: That is correct. You cannot. 
( S.R. 40-41.) 
It will also be readily remembered that a large por-
tion of the Deere Estate lands consisted of subdivided 
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residential lots, 1nore tha.n twenty of which had been 
sold to individual purchasers on the open Inarket to 
other defendant~ in the conden1nation proceeding·. Yet 
the court belo\\" absolutely excluded direct evidence or 
cross exan1ina tion as to lot or acreage values of property 
cotnparable to either the lots or acreage of the J)eere 
Estate. 
MR. BEHLE : If the Court please, I think 
the record is clear on our proffer of proof of 
comparable values. I think the door has been 
closed on us every tin1e \Ve have tried to prove 
and test values, and here is a specific instance. 
THE COURT: Well, the only reason that the 
door is closed to you is that the law provides 
that you shall not do that and I try to follow 
what the law is. I am not trying to close any 
door on you and if you have any doubt about it 
I can show yon the authorities on the value of a 
place. Well, that case Mr. Budge had the other 
day covers that subject. It has not been permitted 
and you persist in it and it is against the law. 
MR. BEHLE: Well, of course, that is one 
of the arguments \Ve have been having right 
along. 
THE COURT: 'Veil, that is right. Of course 
I have heen ruling; against you because I hav<_) 
been ruling it is not lawful for you to divide thi~ 
property into lots, nor the price per lot, or any 
other p-roperty into lots or the values of then1. 
( S.R. -±2-43.) 
* * * 
MR. BEHLE : We also specifically tender 
proof with respect to Indian Village as a corn-
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parable subdivision purchased on an acreage basis 
as raw acreage and the value per acre- of $7,500.00 
shortlY before the date of condemnation and the 
chara~teristics of that area as being comparable. 
MR. BUDGE: Same objection. 
THE COlJRT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. BEHLE: For the record only we again 
1nake a tender in connection with lot sales and 
prices. 
l\iR. BUDGE: Same objection. 
THE COURT: Within the area being con-
den1ned ~ 
~11~. BEHLE: Within the area and compar-
able to the area. 
MR. BUDGE: Same objeetion. 
THE COURT: The objection 1s sustained. 
(S.R. 52.) 
We would have thought it clear that the best evi-
dence of the market value of land, or for that matter 
ahnost any tangible property with a market value, would 
be the actual figures as to which that or comparable 
property \vas selling for on the open market at about 
the time of the valuation. 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 
Ch. XXI. Certainly that is how one proves the value of 
stocks active on the market, or one's automobile, o1· 
home. 
But here all such evidence was completely excluded 
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-\vhether on a front-foot lot or aerpa o·e basis-under 
' ' b 
a sweeping ruling by the court that all such evidence 
\vas unproper. 
This court, in keeping \Yi th the l\la~~ae h U8etts doe-
trine or weight of opinion, is cited b~T Niehol~ ( § :21.3) 
as in accord \Vith the \Yeight of opinion that such evidence 
is adrnissible. Telluride Po-\ver Co. v. Bruneau, .fl l T tah 
4, 125 P. 399. 
The result of Judge \""an Cott's ruling, which ex-
tended also to cross examination, was to leave before 
the jury a naked opinion as to the value of two parcels 
only, and for practical purposes to cut off and restrict 
inquiry into just how such dollar figures were reached 
by the testifying experts. 
Defendants respectfully sub1nit such errors requrre 
reversal for the reasons so well expressed in St. Louis, 
etc. RR. Co. v. Clark (Mo.), 25 s .. W. 192, 26 L.R.A. 751, 
as follo,vs: 
We think the evidence of sales of sirnilar 
property to that in question, made in the neighbor-
hood, about the same time, was adnrissible to aid 
the jury in de-termining the darnage to which the 
owner was entitled. The value of property is 
ascertained largely frorn such sales, and the 
opinions of witnesses as to values are. largely 
predicated upon thern. It is best, when it can be 
done, to put the jurors in possession of all the 
facts from which values are ascertained, and allow 
them to draw the conclusion therefrorn. Witnesses 
basing their opinion upon recent sales of like 
property are liable to exaggerate or underesti-
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1nate values; in any c-onsideration they are no 
n1ore capable of deducing fair conclusi~ns ~ro1n 
the known facts than the jury. The obJect IS to 
ascertain the general 1narket value,_ and i_f par-
ticular sales are made under exceptional c1rcun1-
stances the fact can be shown, and the jury can 
determine its probative force. Certainly no more 
reliable method of determining the fair ma.rket 
values of lands can be reached than that derived 
fran~ bona fide . sales of ·"'·irnilar lands in tlze 
vicinity. The objection that such evidence raises 
collateral issues as to the character of the land 
sold, and the circumstances of such sales, is 1nore 
than compensated for by its value in aiding the 
jury to a correct conclusion. (Italics ours.) 
Point. 
3. The court below improperly ·refused to allow appel-
lants to introduce evidence relating to the fair market value 
of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part thereof. 
To prove the value of the Deere Estate water utility 
systen1, defendants called as an expert witness Engi-
neer C. J. Ullrich, who was inti1nately farniliar 'vith 
and exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion 
as to the value of that water syste1n. This system con-
si~ted of a series of springs, an extensive collection and 
t-~torage ~ystem including dual electric pumps and two 
large storage tanks, transmission lines to the various 
points of use throughout the area under condemnation, 
and then finally distribution lines into the residential 
areas and other points of use. The witness described 
the systen1 in detail and testified that as an integrated 
water utility it had been planned for immediate use in 
the general Oak Hills area and for ultimate use else-
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,,~here after 1952, when Oak Hills was to be connected 
\\~ith the Salt Lake City n1unicipal water systen1. Ohjee-
tions \Yere sustained to all questions with respect to the 
value Of that \Yater systenl Or Of any part thereof. 
( S.R. 9-14.) .A. tender of proof was rejected as to the 
fair 1narket value of that water system (exclusive of 
land rights) being $7 -!,200.00, assignable $10,500.00 to 
the \Yater rights and $63,700.00 to the balance of the 
systen1, of 'vhich $~5,700.00 '"·as allocated to that part 
of the distribution ~ysten1 \Yithin the streets of l~arcel 
I, these being the fair n1arket values as of July 15, 1951. 
(S.R. 16.) 
X o reason \\~as assigned for this exclusion, \\'hich 
~eeu1s beyond comprehension when the general rule is 
that such a utility not only may but must be valued by 
\Yitnesses who have ~'some peculiar means of for1ning 
an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of 
the property in question." Thus it is said that the valua-
tion by utility experts is "ahnost mandatory in all cases 
since it is obvious that values cannot be based in such 
cases on sales or on values at which such property is 
held in the vicinity." 5 Nichols on Eminent Don1ain, 
~ 1~..4-7. 
Yet not only did the eourt exclude the op1n1on of 
the only expert on water utility values; it perntitted 
lay real estate men to lump the utility's value in with 
the land on the basis of indefinite hearsay discussjons 
''with the engineers in the City Water Department, the 
1uost logical buyers." ( S.R. 45.) It violated Sec. 104-34-10. 
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Point. 
4. The court improperly ruled that the property of 
appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole of but 
two separate parcels, each to be separately assessed. 
a. The Statutory Mandate: 
As a matter of right, an owner whose property is 
conde1nned is entitled under Utah law to a separate 
as.~.,·essment for each different parcel of his land that is 
taken. He is also entitled as a matter of right to an 
award for any net. severance damages where there is 
only a partial taking, in addition to the value of the 
part taken. The policy laid down by Utah's legislature 
is to assess separately for each source of damages as 
far as practical. 
104-34-10 .. Compensation and damages-How 
Assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess : 
(1) The value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improve1nents thereon apper-
taining to the realty, and of each and every 
separate estate or interest therein; and if it con-
sists of d~fferent parcels, the value of each parcel 
and of each estate or interest therein shall be 
separately assessed. 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the 
damages which will accrue to the portion' not 
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sought to be condeu1ned by reason of it~ sever-
ance fron1 the portion sought to be eondeinned 
and the eonstruction of the improve1uent in the 
uu1nner proposed by the plaintiff. 
* * ~ 
( 5) .. A .. s far as practieable coinpen8a tion Illust 
be assessed for each source of drunages separately. 
(Ch. S, La""s of lTtah 1951). (Italics ours.) 
.. A.s pointed out in the opinions in the case of State 
v. Fourth District Court, 7~ 1). 2d 502, 94 Utah 384, the 
extent and Ineasure of dainages under Utah law goes 
beyond strict constitutional guaranties ; and aJ though 
these provisions have been on the statute books of Utah, 
California, ~Iontana and Idaho, among other states, for 
1nany decades, their mandate is so clear and unequivocal 
that there haYe been few cases with respect thereto, espe-
cially in recent times. 
b. What Constitutes a "Separate Parcel": 
Decision as to what constitutes a separate parcel to 
be separately assessed is ordinarily a question of la'v 
for the court to determine, since the determinative phy-
sical facts are generally not in dispute. But if there is 
a·conflict as to these facts, a question of fact is presented 
for determination by the jury or court, as the case may 
be. 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 701; St. Paul 
& Sioux City RR. Co. v. Murphy, 19 Minn. 500. 
The three criteria in determining what constitutes 
a separate parcel within the meaning of the Utah Statute 
seem to be (1) com1non ownership, (2) physical contig-
.uity, and (3) common use. All three factors usually must 
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be present, and as stated in Lewis,§ 698: 
"In general it is so much as belongs to the 
sa1ne proprietor as that taken, and is continuous 
with it and used together for a com1non purpose." 
In the case of the Deere Estate, on the basis of the 
issue~ dra\vn and the record before the court there was 
no question a~ to ownership; the factors in question 
W'ere those as to contiguity and common use. The evi-
denee \Ya~ not in conflict, as we see it, and thus the matter 
became a question of law. But before looking to the 
various parts of the entire tract taken of more than 
thirteen c-ity blocks-roughly, an area equivalent to that 
between North. Ternple and 8th South, and from State 
Street to \\Test Temple Street, let us review further 
the authorities. 
I1ewi~ at Section 699, discussing residential areas, 
~tates (italics ours): 
If t\vo or 1nore contiguous city or village 
lot~ are improved and used as one tract, and 
any part of an~T one is taken, the owner may 
recover the da1nage to all; so, where a tract is 
subdivided into lots and blocks, but continues to 
be used as before for agricultural purposes, the 
subdivision being a mere paper one. In the last 
case it is intin1ated that a different rule might 
prevail if the lots were merely held for sale. 
Contiguous lots improved for separate use are 
not one tract. * * * Where a block is divided. by a 
street, the parts become distinct tracts as to each 
other where they are merely held for sale or use 
as building lots. It is held that the subdivision 
of land into lots, makes each lot, prima facie, a 
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separate and distinct tract, and if the o\vner 
claims damages to all or n1ore than the lot taken, 
he n1ust produce evidence to overcome this pre-
sumption. The true rule would seeu1 to he that 
lots and blocks hnproved or used for a eonunon 
purpose should be regarded as one tract, though 
divided by a street or alley; tha.t contigu.ous lots 
in the sa1ne block or square sho·uld be reqa rrled 
as one tract, though vacant and held for ~ale or 
speculation; that lots ilnproved for separa.te use 
should in general be regarded a.s sepaTafe tracts: 
but that if contiguous lots devoted to a separate 
use are more valuable for a conunon use they 
1night properly be regarded as one tract ; and that 
racant lots and blocks, held for sale or speculation 
and separated by streets or alleys should be re-
garded as distinct tracts. 
The foregoing text is amply annotated by cases from 
various jurisdictions. The statements are substantially 
the same as those found in other standard works. For 
example, it is. said in 18 Am. Jur. "Eminent Domain", 
Sec. 270: 
* * *In determining what constitutes a ~ep­
arate and independent parcel of land, when the 
property is actually used and occupied, unity of 
use is the principal test, and if a tract ·of land, 
no part of which is taken, is used in conneetion 
with the sarne farm, or the ~au1e 1nanufacturing 
establishment, or the sa1ne enterprise of any other 
character as the tract, part of which was taken, it 
is not considered a separate and independent par-
cel merely because it was bought at a different 
time, and separated by an i1naginary line, or even 
if the two tracts are separated by a highway, 
railroad or canal. * * * 
* * * 
When parts of the same establishment are 
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separated hy intervening private land, they are 
eonsidered as independent parcels, unless they 
are so inseparably connected in the use to which 
they are applied that the injury or destr~c~ion 
of one rnust necessarily and permanently InJure 
the other. So also, contiguous tracts owned by 
the same person, but used for different purposes 
and rented to different tenants, should be con-
sidered as separate tracts. If both are injured 
by the taking, it is proper to permit the jury to 
consider the reasonable market value of each 
tract. Even if two tracts are contiguous and 
owned by the same owner and used for the same 
purpose, if they are not used in connection with 
each other, they must be considered as separate 
tracts, as, for example, a block of city houses 
rented to different tenants for residential pur-
poses. Vacant and unoccupied land is considered 
to be separated into independent parcels by a 
public street, whatever the intention of the owner 
in regard to future use. A mere platting into 
blocks and lots has been held sufficient in the case 
of vacant land to show, prima facie, at least, a 
division in to separate and independent parcels; 
although as to this there is authority to the con-
trary. 
See also Corpus Juris, Eminent Domain, Section 395; 
the annotation in 57 L.R.A. 937, at page 940; and the 
cases and comment in 2 American Railroad & Corporation 
Reports 184. 
Somewhat the same problem is presented in con-
nection with the requirements that real prop·erty be 
assessed for ad valorem tax purposes by "parcels or 
subdivisions not exceeding six hundre4 forty acres each 
* * * " l 1 tah Code, §80-5-8. The following case applies 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the rule quoted above in conneetion \vith such tax stat-
utes: 
Generally, ~everal lots in the sa1ne bloek, 
contiguous to each other and O\vned by the ~a1ne 
person, are deerned one ~'parcel" of land \Vithin 
eonten1plation of statute requiring full cash value 
of each Hparcel" of land attached to be set do\rn 
in assess1nent roll. Code 1930, ~ 69-24:2, subd. 4. 
Guthrie v. Haun, Or., 76 P. :2d ~9:2, 29-!. 
The san1e problem also is presented where in utort-
gage or execution ~ales, and in order to realize a higher 
arnount for the debtor, real property consisting of several 
kno-w-n lots or '·parcels" is to be sold "separately and not 
as a unit." 
The recent l 1 tah case of Conunercial Bank v. l\1adsen, 
236 P. 2d 343, again applies the same rule set forth above 
as to conde1nnation and tax assessment. In that case two 
contiguous lots owned by the same debtor and in use as a 
·~unified parcel" \Yere held to be the proper subject of a 
single sale. In that case, as the court pointed out,-
The bank prepared and accepted a mortgage 
of this property as one parcel; in its pleadings, 
judgment, notice of sale and throughout the entire 
proceeding it was treated by the bank as one 
parcel of property. The sheriff and two other \vit-
nesses all testified that they considered the land 
as a single parcel of property. The judgment 
debtor testified to the effect that he did not object 
to the sale as a unit and that he had no reason to 
think more money could be raised if the lots \vere 
sold separately. The fact that the land is described 
as "Lots 1 and 2 of block 28, Plat A l\{anti CitY 
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Survey" does not serve to rnake separate tracts 
of an 'otherwise unified parcel. For a discussion 
to the effect that description of property by lots 
does not serve to make it separate parcels, see: 
33 C.J.S .. , Executions, ~ 210, p. 449. 
Finally, we quote from \T olume 4 of Nichols' work 
on Eminent Domain, the third edition of which has just 
been published: 
~ 14.31. What constitutes a separate parcel. 
Diff-icult ques6ons sometirnes arise in deter-
n1ining what constitutes a separate or independent 
parcel or tract of land. · There are a few definite 
r1tles of law that can be laid down. In many cases 
the court can, as a rnatter of law, determine that 
lots are distinct or otherwise, but ordinarily it is 
a practica-l question to be decided by the jury or 
other similar tribunal which passes upon 1natters 
of fact, which should consider evidence on the use 
and appearance of the land, its legal divisions 
and the intent of its owner and conclude whether 
on the 'vhole the lots are separate or not. In such 
cases the land itself rather than the map should 
~be looked at, and one part of a parcel is not to be 
considered separate and independent merely be-
cause it was bought at a different time from the 
rest and is separated from it by an imaginary line. 
( 1) Physical contiguity. 
Actual contiguity between two separate par-
eels is ordinarily essential to merit consideration 
as a unified tract. Actual physical separation by 
an intervening space between two parcels belong-
ing to the same owner is ordinarily ground for 
holding that the parcels are to be treated as inde-
pendent of each other, but it is not necessarily a 
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conclusive test. If the land is actually oeeu pilld 
or in use the unity of the use i~ the chief criterion. 
\\'""hen t\Yo pareel~ are ph~·~ieally distinet there 
n1u~t he ~uch a conneetion or relation of adapta-
tion, convenience and actual and peru1anent use 
as to Inake the enjoyrnent of one reasonably nee-
essary to the enjoy1nent of the other in the 1nost 
advantageous 1nanner in the business for \vhich 
it is used, to constitute a single parcel -vvithin 
the 1neaning of the rule. Accordingly, a public 
high,vay actually wrought and travelled, a rail-
road, a canal, or a creek running through a large 
tract devoted to one purpose does not necessarily 
divide it into independent parcels, provided the 
. owner has the legal right to cross th~ intervening 
strip of land or ""ater. But a public highway will 
ordinarily divide the land of a single owner into 
separate parcels, even if both parcels a.re used for 
the sanze purpose, if the use upon each parcel 
is ~eparate and independent of that up-on the other. 
* * * 
vVhen land is unoccupied and so not devpted 
to use of any character, and especially rzrhcn 'lt 
is held for purposes of sale in building lots, a 
physical division by wrought roads and streets 
creates independent zJarcels as a ma.tter of lau·. 
* * * (Italics our~.) 
c. Appellants have not Waived their Right for Sepa-
rate Assessments. 
Throughout the trial and also by its application to 
this court for an interlocutory appeal, ap.pellants assert-
ed their right to separate assessments for each parcel. 
Thus the right has not been waived, as did occur in Idaho 
under an identical statute where likewise a large area 
of land was condemned for reservoir purposes. In the 
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case of Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson (Ida.), 121. 
P. 88, 92, it was said: 
Under the prov1s1ons of the statute it was 
not necessary that the jury should find the value 
of each legal subdivision of the tract sought to 
be conden1ned. If, however, there is n1ore than 
one parcel of land, or several separate parcels 
or tracts, each separated from the other, then 
it is necessary for the jury to determine the valur: 
of each separate tract or parcel. But where the 
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value 
then rnay be fixed as a single parcel or tract. 
"Parcel" or "tract" of land as used in this sec-
' tion, does not mean legal subdivision, but a con-
solidated body of land, and the finding of the 
jury may be upon each single parcel or tract of 
land. 
* * * 
d. The P~hysical Facts in this Case : 
.r\_pplying the foregoing law to the physical facts of 
the Deere Estate, we find that in the tract-more than 
thirteen large city blocks in area-there are not only 
recorded plats of lots and blocks, and the actual physical 
i1nprovements constituting a subdivision, namely, streets, 
curh and gutter, drainage, fire hydrants, utilities, ete. 
Here vve have further physical barriers such as mountain 
strearns and the steep slopes and cliffs of Emigration 
Canyon. Sections of the Deere Estate property are more 
than a mile apart. Specifically: 
(1) There is an area of 50.60 acres described on 
the map as Tracts II, IV -C and VI, which is essentially 
hillside land. As to this area there are the required 
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requisites pf eounuon o"·nership, use and contiguity. 
In connection 'vith this area \vill be involved the value 
r_rogether this WOUld COll~titute one .. parcel", tllP land and 
the ":--ater utility ~y~ten1 to be each sPpara tely assessed. 
(2) There is an area of 5.81 acres known as Tract 
\"'" \vhich is con1pletely segregated fron1 the other property 
O\\'lled by these defendants and wherein there is both 
common O\vnership and use. This area is Inore than half 
the size of Ten1ple Square, and is a separate "parcel." 
( 3) There is a third separate parcel of 7.35 acres 
known as Tract III which has been developed and is zoned 
for connnercial purposes. It is segregated froin other 
areas by other ownerships on the east, by the state and 
county roads on the north and west, and by Emigration 
Canyon and Creek on the south. 
(4) South of Emigration Creek Canyon are Tracts 
I-D and I\T-B, each of which is divided roughly east and 
west by a dedicated street-Kennedy Drive. 
(a) Tract. I-D consists of a total of 6. 65 acres. 
Of this, 1.5 acres is in the extreu1e south-vvest corner of the 
entire tract to be condemned. Obviously severance daHl-
ages are involved. The same situation pertains to the 
south part of Tract ry··-B. This consists of 5.1-3 acres arbi-
trarily cut out by a straight line division from the heart of 
a tier of proposed residential lots. It is suggested that 
Pach of these two is part of a larger parcel extending 
to the south· wherein severance damages would be in-
volved, and that each should be segregated from the 
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balance of the other land of these defendants which has 
been taken. 
(b) The re1naining area of Tract I-D north of Ken-
nedy Drive consists of 5.51 acres. The remaining area 
of Tract 1\ ... -B north of Kennedy Drive consists of 10.3:~ 
acres-slightly in excess of the area of a large city block. 
If treated as separate parcels, no severance damages 
would be involved. It will be recalled that this part of 
I-D cornprises ten potential residential lots for which 
all utilities have been installed to the extent planned hy 
the subdividers; while this part of area IV-B consists 
of 10.33 acres suitable and planned for residential de-
veloplnent, but wherein no utilities or other improve-
Inent~ have been constructed except for Kennedy Drive. 
1Tnder the authorities, together this entire contiguous 
area constituted another "parcel." 
( 5) Tract IV"-A is an area equal to nearly two city 
hlocks-19.G2 acres-on the extreme north of the entire 
tract herein condemned. As in the case of IV-B, it is 
sui tahle for and had been planned for residential de-
veloprnent. However no utilities had yet been installed 
and the only actual development on the ground had been 
construction of a dividing access road in place-Oa.khills 
Road, and an access road to the Jerry Jones property 
extending north from Oakhills Road opposite Lot 62 
ovvned by W. E. Graham. 
(a) The property to the east of the Jerry Jones 
road consists of a total of 7.77 acres divided into twenty-
one lots and streets actually constructed and existing 
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but not yet dedicated. Of thi~ area Lots G~, 63, fi-l: and 
65 had been sold to other defendant~ prior July 12, 
1951, the area so sold involving 1.13 acres and road 
acees8 rights. These defendants o'vned the re1naining 
lots and the roads eo1npri~ing a t.otal of 6.G4 acre~, con-
stituting another H~eparate parcel." 
(b) The tract \Vest of the Jerry Jones road consist~ 
of 3± lots and streets actually in place although not 
dedicated. This area \Yhich \Ve subrnit constitutes a sep-
arate and different parcel coinprises a total of 11.85 
acres-1nore than a large city block in extent, all of \vhieh 
is o'vned by the~e defendants. 
6. Finally, there is the balance of the areas denonl-
inated in the Brayton affidavits, the answer and by the 
Yarious 1naps as Tracts I-A, I-B and I-C. Here all utili-
ties are in, and the property actua.Zly exi.sted as a number 
of separate residential lots. The law seems clear that a 
separate parcel is involved prirna facie for each lot, and 
at least for each group of contiguous lots. 
The total acreage owned by these defendants in Tract 
I-A is 7.51; in Tract I-B, 14.1; and in Tract I-C, 3.96. 
Tract I-C is a separate parcel because there the sub-
division was not physically coinplete; but in I-A were 
19 separate lots, and ±1 separate lots in I-B. ·Grouping 
the contiguous lots. as was done in requested Instruction 
No. 12 (R. 103), there would be 12 "separate parcels" 
in I-A and I-B as follows: 
a.. Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Oa.k Hills Pia t A. 
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b. Lot 1, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A. 
c. Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A. 
d. Lots 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, Block 3, Oak Hills Plat A. 
e. Lots 1, 2 and 3, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
f. Lot 6, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
g. Lots 8 and 9, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat ~-
h. Lot 11, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A. 
1. Lots 5 and 6, Oak Hills Plat B. 
J· Lots 10, 11 and 12, Oak Hills Plat B. 
k. Lots 69 to 82, Oak Hills Plat B. 
I. Lots 85 to 106, inclusive, Oak Hills Plat B. 
In sumn1ary then, as a matter of law under Section 
104-34-10, the property of these defendants under con-
den1na tion consisted of nineteen separate parcels, each to 
be separately assessed under mandate of Utah's legisla-
ture; and in addition the north parts of two additional 
separate parcels. In these last two cases the statutory 
mandate was that each of the parts taken was to be 
separately assessed; and then there was also to be deter-
Inined the extent of any severance damages to the re·-
nlaining parts of the two parcels involved. 
e. The effect of the two-parcel decision. 
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... \t the oral hearing on the applieation for an inter-
loeutory appeal froln the t\vo-pareel order, nlr. J u~tiee 
Crockett i1u1uired a~ to ju~t ho\v conden1nees \vere being 
prejudiced by the elaiined violation of the statutory 
requiren1ents, and \Y hy \Ve should assu1ne that Judge \Tan 
Cott would connnit prejudicial error in the course of the 
trial. These questions ,,~ere difficult if not iinpossible 
then to ans\Yer, but appellants, fears \Yere fully justified 
by subsequent rulings of the court below as a consequenee 
of the early decision. 
For exa1nple, plaintiff's \Yitnesses were perinitteii 
to assmne that since only two sales were to be 1nade 
of the two parcels each as a whole, necessarily fron1 the 
nature of the parcels the purchasers would be buying 
\vholesale at a discount in order to obtain profits by 
resale of the individual lots and tracts. Thus, for exam-
ple, Witness Ashton's opinion started with an assun1ption 
that normal fair 1narket values of the various components 
of the entire property totaled some $667,000.00. ( Supp. 
R. 39.) Then by applying these assumptions he reduced 
this total for the two parcels to $491,250.00. ( S.R. 33.) 
This was substantially the figure adopted by the jury. 
(R. 118.) 
Also as a consequence of the two-parcel decision, 
the court excluded either on direct or cross exarnina tion 
all evidence as to lot values or evidence of any compar-
able values at all. (S.R. 17, and Point 2 above.) The 
defendants were simply unable to support the figures 
clai1ned in their stricken separate answer as to the fair 
market values of the individual tracts or parcels con-
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stituting their land which was being condemned. The 
effect was to condemn not the property taken, but the 
o1rners because of the large extent of their holdings. 
To illustrate a defendant owning a single lot in Oak 
' Hills is afforded co1npensation to the extent of its full 
1narket ·value. The Deere Estate, owning the identical 
adjacent lot, is cut in two by reason of the application 
of the \Yholesale discounts, etc. If the ownership of the 
two lots were to be reversed, by reason of this change 
alont> the values would reverse and the former indi-
vidually owned lot would be reduced to half its value, 
while the Deere Estate lot would be doubled. 
Likewise as to land suitable for subdivision but not 
yet so subdivided. Mr. Ashton would pay $7500.00 per 
acre for a 6-acre tract, but because the Deere Estate 
o\vned 1nany more times that acreage, the value of its 
land by- virtue of wholesale discounts and a single sale, 
etc., \Vould be diminished to $2500.00 per acre. 
Finally, the court excluded the entire issue of sever-
ance dan1ages, since under its ruling the whole of only 
t\vo parrels was to be condemned and there was no roon1 
for ~everance da1nages for a partial taking as provided 
by the statute. (R. 39, 43.) 
.. A.ppellants can now answer the questions of the 
court at the hearing on the interlocutory appeal by 
stating categorically that the failure of the court below 
to follow the statutory provisions with respect to the 
1nandatory assessment of each separate parcel and the 
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deter1uina tion of ~evernJtt.'P drnnages in the case of partial 
takings reduced the a1nount of the a\Yard of dau1ag·p:-; 
by perhaps $200,000.00. 
f. Utah Cases: 
,,~ e find no Utah cases in point except by inference 
on the reverse of the facts here, the cases of Counnercial 
Bank v. ~Iadsen, supra, and Provo River Water lT ~ers 
.A .. ssociation v. Carlson, 133 P. :2d 777, 103 Utah 93. In 
this latter case conden1nee urged that by reason of his 
ownership and co1nn1on use of two non-contiguous tract~, 
seYerance damages to the tract not conden1ned "\vere in-
volved in connection with a taking of but part of a single 
parcel. However, on the facts of that case and in vievv 
of the non-contiguity the Inajority of this court reversed 
the decision of the court below, holding that tvvo separate 
parcels were involved with a ·complete taking of one 
and no seYerance ·damages allowable as to the other. 
The difference between these cases, it is respectfully 
sub1nitted, is readily apparent from a glance at the 1naps 
and a cursory knowledge of the supporting facts. Here 
there were many separate parcels involved. The effect 
of the court's two-parcel decision, let alone plaintiff's 
claiin that all was a single parcel, was to deprive the 
owners of their right to just compensation. The rulings 
of the court, it is respectfully submitted, were in viola--
tion of the well-known due process and equal protection 
clauses of Utah's Constitution, Article I, S·ections 7, 22, 
24, 26 and 27, a.s well as a flagrant violation of Section 
103-34-10. 
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Likewise was violated the F'ourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution requiring payment of just 
con1pensation for the property taken. This has been 
held to be "the full and perfect equivalent of the property 
taken." Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed. 664. But no such 
eo1n pen sa tion is being paid in this instance. 
Point. 
5. The court improperly eliminated the issue of sev-
erence damages. 
The issue of severance damages, as in the case 0f 
interest as a part of just compensation, is a n1atter sep-
arate and apart from that of the proper determination 
of the fair market value of the land actually taken. 
As discussed at length under Point 4, the court 
detern1ined that the whole of each of two separate parcels 
'vas being condemned. Hence it ruled that under Section 
104-34-10 of the Judicial Code there was no place for 
the allowance of any severance damages. The issue was 
stricken from the pleadings by eliminating defendants' 
avern1ents as to such severance damages set forth in 
their answer (R. 39, 41, 43), and the issue was not 
submitted to the jury (R. 102). 
Apart from the court's determination on other point~ 
in this appeal, it is respectfully submitted that this case 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions 
to reinstate the pleadings a.s to the issue of severance 
damages, and to proceed to hear and determine such 
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I~ sue. 
1\~. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully subrnitted that under the require-
n1ent of the Federal and State Constitutions the just 
con1pensation to be paid these defendants under the 
facts of this particular case require payment of not 
only the fair market value of the property taken, but 
also interest con1puted at the legal rate in order to com-
pensate the owner for his dan1age fron1 July 12, 1951 
when his injury occurred, until May 10, 1952 when the 
amount became payable. 
It is further submitted that the foregoing_ constitu-
tional requirements as 'vell as statutory directives have 
also been violated by reason of the outlined prejudicial 
errors committed by the trial court, resulting in depriv-
ing the owners from an award of just compensation for 
their property. Accordingly, in this respect the judg-
ments of the lower court should be reversed and a new 
trial ordered. 
C. C. P AR'SONS, 
A. D. MOFF:AT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
47 
.Attorneys for .A ppellarnts 
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